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Colloquium Brief
U.S. Army War College,
The Center for Latin American Issues,
The George Washington University

BRAZIL’S SECURITY STRATEGY AND DEFENSE DOCTRINE
Compiled by
Andrew Fishman
The Center for Latin American Issues
Max Manwaring
Strategic Studies Institute
KEY INSIGHTS:
•

I n 1999, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was created, with a civilian cabinet Minister in charge
of all three branches of the Armed Forces. The MOD, however, was staffed by technicians and
professionals from various government agencies. The MOD will now be staffed by its own
professional defense bureaucracy.

•

 he Armed Forces have also been given new missions. The new missions are based on the
T
precept that national military and security activities are interrelated and involve the economy, environment, politics, national productive potential, science, and technology. Therefore,
the military and civilian spheres must work together in partnership to achieve their common
goals.

•

 he principle elements of the new national defense project (Projecto Nacional) will, as a reT
sult, include: 1) New technologies; 2) A space program; 3) Nuclear capacity for peaceful purposes; 4) Restructuring of the Armed Forces; 5) Related military hardware acquisitions; and 6)
Domestic and border security.

•

 razil has no expansionist intentions. Its aim is to bolster internal strategic defense and secuB
rity, and intra-Latin American cooperation.

INTRODUCTION
In September 2007, Brazil’s President Lula mandated the establishment of a national defense strategy. In December 2008, the Minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim, sent that strategy to the President. In
2010, President Lula signed executive orders to implement the new strategy (the Projecto Nacional).
In that context, The Center for Latin American Issues (CLAI) and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
conducted a colloquium entitled “Brazil’s Security Strategy and Defense Doctrine,” on October 20,
2010, in Washington, DC. The Brazilian Minister of Defense (MOD), the Hon. Nelson Jobim, provided

a broad and expansive look at Brazilian security
strategy and defense doctrine based on historical precedents, and on the related Armed Forces
restructuring plan implemented in 2010 under
his tenure. The following is a synopsis of the important points touched upon during the MOD’s
80-minute presentation.
Over the years, the Brazilian Armed Forces
have been changing in character and structure,
but it was not until 1999 that the MOD was created with a civilian Cabinet Minister in charge of
all three branches of the Armed Forces: the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force. The MOD, however,
was staffed by “an agglomeration of foreigners,”
meaning that the Ministry was staffed by technicians and professionals from Petro Bras, the Bank
of Brazil, and various other government agencies.
The MOD will now be staffed by its own professional defense bureaucracy.
The Armed Forces  have also been reorganized
to be more responsive to the MOD, and have been
given new missions. The new missions are based
on the precept that national defense and security
activities are highly interrelated, and involve the
economy, politics, environment, national productive potential, science, and technology. Therefore,
the military and government spheres must work
together in close partnership to achieve their common objectives and national autonomy.
Brazil is a developing nation well situated in
time and place. Unlike other areas of the world, it
has no bloody religious or ethnic conflicts, and its
last border conflict took place in the early 19th century. It has a strategic geography, low population
density, characteristically rhetorical (as opposed
to physical) conflicts, social symmetry, abundance of natural resources, and is distant from the
traditional power centers of the world, as are its
Latin American neighbors. However, Brazil is the
most populous Latin American nation, with nearly 200 million inhabitants, and thousands of miles
of land and sea borders. These borders, together
with large natural gas and oil reserves and the
“Green” Amazon (land and river areas within the
Amazon Basin) and “Blue” Amazon (coastal areas of Brazil where major hydro-carbon and other
resources are located), are strategic strengths, as
well as concerns for the Armed Forces and the nation.

The resultant new national defense strategy
consists of three principal elements that Brazil
hopes to develop. They are: 1) advanced technologies; 2) a space program; and 3) a peaceful
nuclear capacity.
Advanced Technologies.
The MOD discussed the shortcomings of
Brazil’s research and development in terms of
integration, underinvestment, and the necessity
of technology transfer. In addition to expanding funding for the military, aeronautical, marine, and nuclear research facilities, the Projecto
Nacional aims to consolidate their work and to
better integrate their efforts with national universities. Also, regarding the multiple military contracts the Minister discussed, he emphasized that
Brazil is not a country that “buys” hardware, but
enters joint venture agreements with shared production responsibilities and technology transfer,
so that in the future it may independently produce its own military equipment. Both the space
and nuclear programs are inexorably linked to
the development of advanced technologies.
Space Program.
Brazil has been relying on the purchase of satellite images and information from other countries. As a growing power, the Minister averred,
this position is untenable. With a launch site close
to the equator in Alcatara, in Maranhao state, it
is comparatively inexpensive to launch satellites
from Brazil. The government will, therefore, pursue the development of this site and the rockets
necessary to launch satellites, thereby reducing
dependence on foreign countries and bolstering
Brazil’s space presence.
Minister Jobim also spoke to the shortcomings of the U.S.-based Global Positioning System
(GPS), particularly in the southern hemisphere.
Rather than rely solely upon this system, Brazil
will develop a mechanism that allows it to combine and freely alternate between the three dominant global positioning systems: GPS, Europe’s
Galileo, and Russia’s GLONASS, for greater functionality and versatility.
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Super Cougar transport helicopters, along with
the technology transfers. The helicopters will
be assembled in Brazil. Additionally, Empresa
Brasileira de Aeronautica, S.A. (Embraer) has
plans to begin production of the KC-390 transport
aircraft by 2018. It has already signed agreements
with Colombia, Chile, the Czech Republic, and
Portugal to work together on this project. Jobim
says the KC-390 will be produced at half the cost
of the American-made Hercules transport aircraft. Then, the MOD spoke about the FX2 fighter
jet. Contract bids have been made, but commercial partners will not be selected until after the
presidential run-off elections held on October 30,
2010. The MOD said that it plans to have the full
capacity to build the FX2 independently within
the next 8 to 10 years.
All of these acquisitions are meant to transform the Armed Forces’ capacity for strategic
mobilization. These new hardware acquisitions
will also allow the military to achieve its goals
of strengthening border security, protecting vital
domestic infrastructure, and securing the Green
and Blue Amazons.

Peaceful Nuclear Capacity.
According to the MOD, nations operating on
the international stage are accorded a higher level
of respect if they have nuclear capabilities. As a
rising power, Brazil should focus on developing this area for three purposes: 1) nuclear submarines (without nuclear arms); 2) medical and
agricultural uses; and 3) energy. Nuclear power
plants could help supplement the national reliance on hydroelectric dams that makes the country susceptible to, and dependent on, seasonal
rainfall patterns. The new Projecto Nacional includes three additional elements: 1) restructuring
the Armed Forces; 2) military hardware acquisitions; and 3) domestic infrastructure and border
security.
Restructuring the Armed Forces.
Prior to the new restructuring of the Armed
Forces, there were many internal squabbles
among the three branches. Previously, the
President would select a 4-star service chief to
head the Joint Chiefs for a 2-year term, after which
the chief would return to his respective branch of
service. This system pressured the chief to inappropriately favor his own branch, as head of the
other chiefs. Under the new system, the chief selected would be reassigned to the reserves, be deactivated, and be unable to return to his previous
branch, thereby eliminating his potential bias.
This further increases the power of the MOD.

Domestic and Border Security.
Minister Jobim defined the critical national
infrastructure as consisting of petroleum fields;
gas fields in the Amazon; international hydrocarbon pipelines; hydroelectric dams; refineries of
bio-diesel and oil; thermo-electric plants; natural
gas plants; the nuclear energy production areas
of Angra do Reis, Rezende, and Ipero; ports; airports; telecommunication facilities; the highway
network; and the electric power grid. To protect
these areas, Brazil must do a better job of securing its 9.7 million kilometers of land borders, in
addition to its expansive coastline and river networks. These areas are easy points of entry for
hostile forces to attack Brazil and take down vital infrastructure. Thus, the defense strategy has
introduced a new program for helping to secure
the borders. It is called the Integrated System for
Monitoring the Borders (SISFRON).
Under this plan, the Army would add 28 frontier platoons to the Amazon region, based mainly
at river border crossings, bringing the total to 49.
These units would be primarily responsible for

Military Hardware Acquisitions.
Brazil is making substantial investments in
military hardware. It is purchasing four traditional and one nuclear submarine in an agreement with France. A new facility for the submarines will be built in Itaguai, Rio de Janeiro state,
at a total cost of 6.7 billion euros. Additionally,
the Navy will acquire five patrol ships, five frigates, and a supply ship to patrol the coastal areas of Brazil that Minister Jobim calls the “Blue
Amazon.”
Brazil has entered into another agreement
with France to acquire 56 Eurocopter EC 725
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pursuing environmental crime and illicit smuggling. At the same time, the Navy would develop
a “Second Fleet” to patrol the Amazon River network and secure the mouth of the Amazon River.
The Air Force would use its new helicopters and
planes to target potential threats, and to transport troops quickly and efficiently to threatened
points. To pursue this plan, the Army will vary
its brigade structure and create specialized heavy
and light brigades that can more efficiently respond to particular concerns.
The Minister then spoke to the government’s renewed faith in the military-controlled
CINDACTA (Centro Integrado de Defesa Aérea
e Controle de Tráfego Aéreo [Integrated Air
Traffic Control and Air Defense Center]) air traffic control system for both military and civilian
air traffic, because of the military’s efficiency and
because the military cannot go on strike. With
the growth of domestic and regional civilian air
traffic, the MOD plans on constructing three new
CINDACTA bases spread across the Amazon to
monitor all air traffic.

Conclusion.
In his concluding remarks, Minister Jobim
stressed that Brazil has no expansionist intentions. Its aims are to bolster strategic defense and
security, and intra-Latin American cooperation.
*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the
Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.
*****
More information on the Strategic Studies
Institute’s programs may be found on the Institute’s
homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
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